Wine prices rose rapidly between 2001 and 2011 but have now stagnated. The growth phase could be explained by the increased demand from emerging markets while the subsequent stagnation may result from the crowding eect caused by the entry of numerous new varieties onto the wine market. The generalized model of ideal variety proposed by Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009) combines these two elements and focusing on French exporters, we nd partial support for this explanation at the world level. A 1% increase in GDP per-capita (income eect) generated an increase in price of 1.13% between 2001 and 2011. In contrast a 1% increase in market size (competition eect) reduced prices by 1.10% over the same period. This paper goes further into the analysis of these eects by considering wine exports according to the mode of transport used and indirectly evaluates economies of scale when wine is exported by land, sea or air (via a gravity equation). Economies of scale are observed for transport by plane and ship but not for road. A 10% increase in the value of wine exported by road (plane) leads to a rise (reduction) in transport costs of 0.5% (19%).
Introduction
What is the impact of per capita GDP growth on prices? On one hand, richer agents are more willing to pay high prices, but on the other hand richer markets attract more companies and this new competition can reduce prices. What is the net impact? Do rms generally set higher prices on richer markets? These questions are both signicant and controversial in terms of international economics. In standard models of monopolistic competition with homothetic preferences (e.g. Krugman, 1980) , the law of one price is veried ; markups, prices and the elasticity of demand are invariant to competition and income. The price of one type of goods diers between countries because of trade costs or preferences. In models with strategic interactions along a nite product space (e.g. Lancaster, 1979) , more rms entering the market causes a crowding eect, varieties become more substitutable and the price elasticity of demand, although invariant to income, increases with market size (i.e. competition). The empirical interpretation of this result is that, once we control for competition, the elasticities of the demand would be identical in rich and poor countries. The same result is obtained in models with heterogeneous rms and quasi-linear preferences ( e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) . In contrast, by extending the Lancasterian approach, propose a model where per capita GDP growth attracts more sellers, leads to more competition and forces rms to set lower prices. This result has been challenged by Simonovska (2015) , both by proposing a new model 1 and also by controlling for transport costs in her empirical analysis. The fact of disregarding logistics companies, that apply lower transport costs to both richer and larger markets (according to economies of scale, competition) can bias the result.
By working with 245 identical products sold exclusively on the Internet and by taking into account shipping prices, Simonovska (2015) nds that rms set higher prices for identical goods in richer destinations but are not inuenced by the market size.
Our paper pursues these studies with two goals, the rst is to use insight from this existing literature to analyse the wine market, the second is to use the wine market to test competing models of international economics. We use a unique dataset for 20012011 that reports bilateral export prices for French producers selling to all importers worldwide. The panel data structure makes it possible to identify price levels that are specic to an importer-product (taste, culture, etc) and price changes that are specic to an exporter-product (quality, etc), 2 relating changes in prices over-time for 1 Simonovska (2015) proposes a model with non-homothetic preferences from a hierarchic-choice of consumption (Jackson, 1984) . In this model where the marginal utility is bounded (consumers may have zero demand for some varieties, see also Sauré, 2012) , the relative price of a variety is higher in relatively richer markets which contradicts Hummels and Lugovskyy's (2009) results.
2 The current paper is not interested in vertical dierentiation i.e. we wish to control for the high price of wine on richer market due to the fact that rich importers demand goods of high quality. See 6 The market size, approximated by importer GDP, has a negative eect on the price dierential as well as on export share, revealing a competition eect on external markets for French producers.
While our data does not enable us to control for shipping costs as in Simonovska (2015), we do know the means of transport; trade ows can therefore be separated and analyzed in detail in order to reconcile standard models with the data. We show that a standard gravity equation performs poorly for the wine sector. However, we nd that a more precise specication of trade costs helps to improve this performance. Imitating pro-competitive eects, it is possible that shipping prices react to change in market size.
This change is due to economies (or dis-economies) of scale in transportation. With endogenous trade costs, an increase in income per-capita has a stronger impact on the trade of high quality wines exchanged under modes of transport with high economies of scale. We quantify to which degree wines exported by water and land benet from a smaller income eect than wine exported by air. To our knowledge, such an analysis beer sector.
of export linked to transport has never before been studied in wine economics.
Our paper is in four parts. Firstly we give a brief introduction and presentation of our database. Secondly, by applying the Hummels and Lugovsky (2009) methodology, we show the empirical results for the wine sector. Thirdly, we analyse alternative models and show our investigations into the role of (dis)economies of scale in wine transport.
Finally we draw our conclusions.
2
Data and preliminary results
In this section, we briey present our data set and our rst results based on the Gen- with a strong growth in terms of GDP per capita, the value of Bordeaux wine exported stagnated. In Argentina, a country that developed over that period to become the fth world wine producer, the nominal exportation of Bordeaux even declined. According to the GMIV model, two opposing eects related to income and income per-capita are crucial to the analysis of trade elasticities. On one hand, a rise of income generates more demand and the entry of new varieties. This leads to more competition between rms which proceed to reduce their mark-ups in order to stay in the market.
Ceteris paribus, there are lower prices in larger markets.
On the other hand, consumers are increasingly nicky regarding the gap between current consumption and the ideal variety when consumption of a typical variety increases. Consequently, the richer the consumer, the more they appreciate value of a variety that is close to the ideal. This reaction encourages rms to set higher prices.
All else being equal (in particular market size), rms set higher prices when consumers are richer. While the market size generates a pro-competitive eect, increasing price elasticity, rising income per worker reduces this elasticity.
To capture these opposed eects in the wine sector we consider that changes in the price set by a French producer j on a product k in the country i at time t depends on destination GDP and GDP per capita:
where Y i measures the market size of the partner country i, approximated by GDP, and L i,t the population (GDP and population statistics are from the WDI database). A negative coecient a 1 is expected to conrm that the market size reduces price due to a competition eect that increases price elasticity. In contrast, a positive coecient a 2 conrms that, depending on market size, a rise in GDP per capita increases prices due to the income eect (that reduces price elasticity). Fixed eects at the product and rm level are introduced to control for cost and quality variations. We do not introduce destination xed eects which would control for variations that are specic to importers. In fact these eects would capture the eect of economic growth of the partners we intend to measure. In other words, we exploit cross-importer variation to assess the income and competition eect. OLS Estimations (RSE in brackets) a: signicant at 1%, b: at 5%. All variables are in Log. 
Where Y i and Y j are incomes (GDPs), L i and L j are the populations in i and j, P i and P j are price indices, τ ij represents bilateral trade costs and σ is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties. With α = 1 and β = 0 the gravity equation is similar to that obtained in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Krugman (1980) , there is no income eect, in contrast with β = 0 by which luxury and goods of basic necessity can be analysed.
To discriminate between this general equation and the GMIV prediction, we simply have to use this formula to compute imports of the rest of the world from j, i.e. x k rj :
and we use this expression to compute the trade-share s k ij , which is the i's import from j on imports of the rest of the world, r from country j. Taking the logarithm of this share nally provides the following equation:
The interesting feature of this computation is that all the variables specic to French producers have been eliminated. Moreover, by using partner-product xed eects, denoted by f k i , we can capture specic characteristics of importers (GDP per capita, price index, etc). In short, taking the logarithm of (3) using (2) enables the following equation to be estimated:
The
To validate the CES model (and also other models where GDP per-capita enters in a multiplicative form as we have shown), only the coecient of distance should be signicant (with a 2 = a 3 = 0 Equation (3) is reduced to Equation (4) obtained from the general gravity equation).
They nd that a 2 < 0 and a 3 > 0 are statistically signicant, which validates their model. We have applied this methodology to our database. Geographical distance between countries is taken from the CEPII database. Table ( 2) illustrates results.
Column 1 is the benchmark with similar independent variables to those used in the previous section (GDP and GDP per capita) in interaction with distance. OLS Estimations (RSE in brackets) with years, rms and product-xed eects a: signicant at 1%, b: signicant at 5%, c: signicant at 10% Using other variables (based on income instead of share) we obtained similar results.
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Lastly Column 4 and 5 use the wine production in the destination market to test the robustness of our result regarding the competition eect. Once again, the interaction with distance is signicant.
Non-homothetic preferences and trade costs
Surprisingly the GMIV has a better predictive power than alternative models based on the widely-used standard/powerful gravity equation (2) . Consequently we return to this equation and after rearrangement and by taking the log of (2) we obtain the following expression:
From this we estimate the following equation by separating wines exported by air, water and land:
We expect to obtain support for non-homothetic preferences with a positive impact of GDP per capita for wine exported by air. These wines may be of better quality than wine exported via other transport systems and consequently may be more sensitive to GDP per capita. The crucial coecient is that of population; indeed with a negative sign, a 2 < 0 we verify that β > 0 and thus the gravity equation (2) .
To control for price index, we refer to a wide range of literature using consumer price indices (e.g. Bergstrand, 1989; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2014 
where b ij includes dummies representing common language, lang ij , and past colonial links, col ij , such as b ij = dist ij col ij . Common language and colonial history appear crucial in explaining bilateral trade but direct measures are riddled with intrinsic errors.
By using a constructed 0-1 index we limit the extent of these errors. In wine economics the importance of past colonial links has been studied for instance by Melonni and Swinnen (2014) who detail the rise and fall of Algeria as the largest wine-exporter, worldwide during the French colonization.
We use the OLS estimator, as well as the PPML and Gamma estimators. Estimations realized with year, rm and product xed eects a: signicant at 1%, b: signicant at 5%, c: signicant at 10% Table 3 : Gravity equation
Columns 1, 2 and 3 give results for wine exported by plane using the three dierent estimators. Distance and price index have the expected sign, but GDP and population contradict the theory. A positive sign is obtained for population, rejecting the idea that wines exported using this mode of transport are luxury goods. On the contrary, the theory is validated for wines exported by ship and road reported in Table 3 in column 4 and 5 using OLS.
16 This validation of non-homothetic preferences is surprising since wines exported by road can be considered as basic goods not characterized by a strong income eect. After various robustness checks providing similar results, we conclude that these initial results are correct and that the theoretical model needed to be revisited. To reconcile our data with theory we decided to introduce economies of scale in transport. Depending on export-value, obviously rms pay dierent transport costs.
There is a wide range of literature on this topic. By referring to this literature, we assume that transport costs take the following form:
where x k ij,t represents the wine exports in value and η density (dis)economies. There are economies of scale with η negative, and diseconomies in the opposite case. Inserting this function in the gravity equation and resolving for x k ij,t to eliminate the endogeneity bias gives:
This last gravity equation is helpful in revisiting the previous results. In particular in comparison with Equation (7) the coecient of distance now consists of the following parameters:
For air transport according to the estimation using the Gamma PML estimator we have a 3 = −0.143, thus assuming an elasticity of substitution equal to 5 (which is a realistic value of σ according to estimations of Broda and Weinstein, 2004) , we obtain η = −1.988. From such a result we can now deduce β, we have:
17 There also are interesting theoretical papers, for instance Duranton and Storper (2008) propose a model whereby the decrease in transport costs can generate an increase in trade costs. In their model with vertical dierentiation and where the quality of input is not contractible, they show that a decrease in transport costs leads to exchange of higher quality goods for which trade costs increase.
Lastly the assumption of endogenous transport costs with respect to trade is not innocuous in terms of specialization and location choice (see Matsuyama, 2007 and Behrens, Gaigné and Thisse, 2009 , Behrens and Picard, 2011 and from Table (3, Gamma PML) the coecient of population gives a 2 = 0.075 thus using η and σ we arrive at β = −0.524. This result conrms the income eect that was previously rejected. Lastly by using the coecient of GDPs from:
with a 1 = −0.034 we get α = 0.762 which is relatively close to the unit elasticity of GDP obtained in many trade gravity equations. We note that our calculation of α and β does not depend on existing estimations of σ. In other words these parameters only depend on our estimations in table (3) . Resolving the system (8, 9, 10) gives expressions of (η,β,α) where η depends on σ but where α and β only depend on estimates: Calculation for η using σ = 5 We consider three regions: Bordeaux, Alsace and Languedoc Roussillon.
Bordeaux is recognized worldwide for its wine and the wines produced there have the most prestigious reputation in our sample.
We chose Alsace as a region producing white wines with a clear dierentiation including the reputable dry Riesling and Gewürztraminer wines. This region also has the advantage of being located near the urbanisation corridor of Western Europe, with a population of around 111 million, oering producers an advantage in terms of market access.
Lastly, we consider the Languedoc Roussillon region which is one of the main wine producers in France, with annual production volumes that have been known to surpass the production of nations like the United States. However the production is heterogeneous in terms of quality and the region suers from a poorer reputation than wines produced elsewhere (e.g. in Bordeaux). OLS with RSE in brackets corrected by clusters on destination market. a: signicant at 1%, b: signicant at 5%, c: signicant at 10% All variables are in Log Table 5 : Price regressions for French wines Interestingly, for Bordeaux wines the coecient of market size is insignicant, indicating that competition is less erce for these wines. This result supports the GMIV model, extended to take into account reputational eects which can neutralize the eect of competition. The total eect of per capita GDP growth, only depends therefore on a 2 in Equation (1) and is equal to 1.26, which is clearly the strongest impact. For wines produced in Alsace and in Languedoc Roussillon the total eect is of a 1 + a 2 = −0.09 and of 0.11 respectively. The negative total eect for Alsace wines is worth noting since it has never previously been obtained and indicates that the total eect of per capita GDP growth can increase price elasticity. A vast majority of wines produced in these regions are products benetting from labels such as the AOC classication (Appelation d'Origine Contrôlée) or PGI (Protected Geographical Indication) providing a positive eect on the reputation of these wines. The last column of Table ( 
